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ABSTRACT
Yang, Kai. M.S.E.C.E., Purdue University, August 2011. A Multi-stage Non-cooperative
Iris Recognition Approach with Enhanced Template Security. Major Professor: Eliza
Yingzi Du.
Biometrics identifies/verifies a person using his/her physiological or behavioral
characteristics. It is becoming an important ally for law enforcement and homeland
security. Among all the biometric modalities, iris is tested to be the most accurate
one. However, most existing methods are not designed for non-cooperative users and
cannot work with off-angle or low quality iris images. In this thesis, we propose a
robust multi-stage feature extraction and matching approach for non-cooperative iris
recognition. We developed the SURF-like method to extract stable feature points,
used Gabor Descriptor method for local feature description, and designed the multi-
stage feature extraction and matching scheme to improve the recognition accuracy
and speed. The related experimental results show that the proposed method is very
promising. In addition, two template security enhanced schemes for the proposed non-
cooperative iris recognition are introduced. The related experimental results show
that these two schemes can effectively realize cancelability of the enrolled biometric
templates while at the same time achieving high accuracy.
11. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Biometrics identifies/verifies a person using his/her physiological or behavioral
characteristics [1]. It is becoming an important ally for law enforcement and homeland
security. Biometric characteristics can be physiological (such as iris [2], face [3, 4],
finger image [5, 6], hand geometry [7, 8], and palm print [9, 10]), behavioral (such
as signature [11] and typing rhythm [12]), or a combination of both (such as gait
[13, 14] and voice [15]). A biometric system senses a biometric signal, extracts a
salient set of features, encodes them into templates, and compares them with the
templates existing in a database [16]. A typical biometric identification procedure
includes the enrollment stage and the authentication stage. During the enrollment,
raw biometric data is fed to the feature extractor; a template is extracted and stored in
a database. During the authentication stage, the same feature extraction procedures
are implemented on the query biometric signal, and using pattern recognition methods
to check whether it is related to its claimed identity in the database (Figure 1.1).
Compared to the traditional authentication approaches (such as password or iden-
tification card), biometric is more secure, more convenient to users, and more resistant
to fraud. Within all the biometric modalities, iris has been tested to be one of the most
accurate biometrics. Iris recognition devices have been widely deployed at airports,
government departments, key labs, etc. According to the statistics and prediction of
International Biometric Group (IBG), iris recognition will expect a sustainable incre-
ment in the near future and the total market of iris recognition technology is going to
exceed 700 million USD in 2014. More potential applications related to iris recogni-
2tion are expected, especially in public security (criminal detection, surveillance, etc.)
and private information protection (access control, e-banking, etc.).
Fig. 1.1.: A typical biometric system
Currently, iris recognition methods can work very well with frontal-looking and
high quality images. Within, Daugman’s 2D Gabor wavelet approach has been
tested and evaluated using large databases, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
database with over 600,000 iris images with over 200 billion comparisons [17]. The
positive iris recognition requires high cooperation from users, which may make the
recognition process inconvenient and ineffective. Moreover, with the more and more
increasing requirements of security nowadays, non-cooperative iris is a promising so-
lution for video surveillance and watch list monitoring (identifying wanted criminals
or suspects). However, most existing methods are not designed for non-cooperative
users and cannot work with off-angle or low quality iris images [18]. First, it is very
challenging to accurately segment off-angle iris images. Second, the iris features are
often deformed and it is very challenging to perform feature extraction and matching.
Another concern about current commercialized iris recognition systems is the se-
curity issue of the traditional biometric systems. The traditional biometric systems
are vulnerable to attacks. Ratha et al. [19] analyzed all possible attacks to a biometric
system (Figure 1.2). Each part of the system, including sensor, extractor, matcher,
3database and the channel between them are vulnerable to the danger of Trojan Horse,
phishing and overriding templates and results. In the signal acquisition module, at-
tackers can use a fake biometric to fool the user interface. During the transmission,
attackers can intercept the signal and replace it with one they recorded before to get
invalid access, which is referred to as replay attack. The true features and matching
input/output can be tampered during the feature extraction and matching process.
The template database and the channel between database and matcher could also
be a loophole attacked by hackers. The attackers can even directly change the final
result to ruin the system.
Fig. 1.2.: Possible attacks to a biometric system
Jain et al. further summarized these attacks into four types [20]: attacks on user
interface, attacks on modules, attacks on channels, and attacks on templates. The
most common attack on user interface is the spoofing attack on the signal acquisition
module. The adversary tries to fool the biometric system by presenting faked biomet-
ric traits to the sensor. Several implementations of liveness test [21–23] in biometric
systems have been proposed to deal with this problem. Attacks on modules refer to
direct attacks on biometric device modules, including attacks on hardware modules
and software modules. For example, the adversary attacks the executable program
4using a Trojan Horse [24] to modify the input/output into the value he desires. It
is possible to attack the biometric systems on the channels between modules, e.g.
intercepting original signals and replaying them with those they intercepted before or
fake ones. This will ruin the final matching results or cause the Denial of Service [25]
problem. Although the replay attack can be detected by adding a timestamp to the
signal [26, 27], it is widely accepted that the encryption and transformation should
be implemented from the beginning part of the biometrics identification system, nor-
mally combined with the signal acquisition module. Moreover, attacking on the stored
templates also leads to serious security and privacy issues therefore arouses the most
concern. We will discuss this in Chapter 4.
Unlike traditional authentication methods (password, pin, smartcard, etc.), iris
is always binding with user and cannot be replaced once compromised. Algorithms
that can ensure the iris template security and replaceability are required for future
iris recognition applications. In particular, it is desirable to have a system that can
re-generate a new pattern if the one being used is lost, or generate different patterns
for different applications to prevent cross-matching.
The objective of this thesis is to study the fundamental issues about iris based
authentication methods and develop a fast, robust and effective method to perform
non-cooperative iris recognition, while at the same time achieving iris template secu-
rity and replaceability.
1.2 Organization
The thesis is organized as follow. First, we will focus on the proposed speed-up
multi-stage non-cooperative iris recognition method, including Chapters 2 and 3. Re-
lated works of non-cooperative iris recognition will be reviewed and summarized in
Chapter 2 and the proposed method will be introduced in Chapter 3 along with its
related experimental results and analysis. Second, we will focus on security enhanced
approach based on the proposed non-cooperative iris recognition, including Chapter 4
5and Chapter 5. The related biometric template protection methods and security en-
hance schemes are reviewed, analyzed and summarized in Chapter 4. Two cancelable
template protection schemes based on the previous non-cooperative iris recognition
approaches in Chapter 3 are proposed in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 draws some
conclusions and future work.
62. RELATED WORKS OF NON-COOPERATION IRIS
RECOGNITION
2.1 Traditional Iris Recognition
The iris (Figure 2.1) is the colorful ring of tissue that allows light to enter the
interior of the eye. The iris is made up of connective tissue and has an intricate pattern
of furrows, ridges and pigments spots. These patterns have proven to be unique from
person to person in several large scale tests [17]. The iris is stable over long periods
of time and it can be acquired in a non-contact manner. In addition, the universality
of iris also makes it a good biometric trait for human positive identification.
Fig. 2.1.: Iris image
Like other biometrics, iris recognition has both enrollment and recognition stages
[28]. In the enrollment stage iris information is obtained in the following steps: image
7acquisition, iris segmentation, feature extraction, template generation, and matching
(Figure 2.2). The recognition process (Figure 2.3) includes acquisition, segmentation
feature extraction and template generation, and template matching.
Fig. 2.2.: Iris enrollment process
Fig. 2.3.: Iris recognition process
2.1.1 Iris Acquisition
The iris image acquisition acquires qualified images of eye region for further pro-
cess. Iris images are usually acquired by a near-infrared (NIR) camera because NIR
can reveal rich iris patterns even from iris with dark pigmentation [29]. For light
color eyes, using visible lights can reveal enough features. Existing iris acquisition
system can be divided into two types, depending on how much cooperativeness they
acquired from the user. The first type is cooperative system which requires users to
adjust their head position to acquire qualified images for the system [28,30]. Most of
the commercialized iris recognition systems are cooperative and the user may need
to take several attempts to provide an acceptable image. The second type has fewer
constraints in image acquisition. The system is trying to capture qualified iris image
at a distance or while subjects are walking at a normal speed. Matey et al. have
8designed less constrained iris recognition system, Iris On the Move (IOM), which can
obtain iris images from people walking at normal speed through their system and
then performs matching on the images that are obtained [31]. Fancourt et al. showed
in [32] that it is possible to acquire qualified images at a distance up to 10 meters.
Narayanswamy et al. [33] proposed a wavefront coded imaging technique to overcome
the constraints of the lens and increase the iris imaging depth-of-field. Image quality
measure and image restoration methods are also sometimes applied to ensure good
image quality in less-cooperative situations [34].
2.1.2 Iris Segmentation
The iris segmentation module extracts iris patterns from the other eye parts (e.g.
pupil, eyelids, and eyelashes) which are considered as noise [35]. In order to segment
the iris part correctly, the pupillary boundary, the limbic boundary, the eyelids and
eyelashes need to be detected.
Several typical segmentation algorithms have been proposed during the past two
decades. The most commonly used method assumes that both limbic and pupillary
boundaries are circles, which is referred as circular model based method. This type of
methods looks for the circular pattern of iris and pupil and works well for frontal gazed
images. Daugman [29] proposed modeling the pupil and iris as circles with integro-
differential operators to detect the center and the radius by finding the maximum in
the Gaussian blurred partial derivative with respect to radius, and center coordinates.
Ma et al. developed a segmentation method by approximating the pupil centroid
coordinates and applying Canny edge detection and Hough transform only in iris
region determined by center of the pupil [36]. Similar implementations have been
proposed in [37,38].
However, the circular assumption is often not true in real life applications when
a slight off-angle happens in the eyeball direction. The segmentation accuracy is not
high in such situations. Some research proposed ellipse model based methods which
9can mitigate the segmentation error in non-ideal situations. Zuo and Schmid [39] ap-
plied a rotated and translated ellipse based model with five parameters to fit the limbic
and pupillary boundaries. Du et al. [34] proposed a video-based non-cooperative iris
image segmentation scheme using a direct least-squares fitting of ellipses method to
model the deformed pupil and limbic boundaries. Shapeless methods allow the iris
and pupil boundaries to be segmented accurately even if it is not perfectly circular or
ellipse. Daugman [2] proposed an active contour based segmentation method. This
method describes the iris inner and outer boundaries in a snake graph. The thick-
ness of this line represents the sharpness of the radial edge and the amplitude of the
image represents the roundness of the snake. Shah and Ross proposed a geodesic
active contours method to extract the iris from the surrounding structures [40]. This
technique relies on the order of the Fourier series to approximate the inner and outer
boundaries of the iris.
2.1.3 Iris Recognition
After the image has been acquired and segmented, it is important to extract stable
and unique iris features and encode the features so that the unique features can be
represented as templates. Once the image has been encoded it can then be compared
to other encoded images. We categorize and discuss different types of iris recognition
methods respectively.
2.1.3.1. Phase Information Based Approach
Daugman [29] proposed 2D Gabor wavelet on the polar image, and encoded the
phase information according to the sign of the real and imaginary axis. All the current
commercialized iris recognition systems are based on this algorithm.
h(Re, Im) = sgn(Re, Im)
∫∫
I(ρ, φ) · e−iω(θ0−φ) · e−i(
(r0−ρ)2
α2
+
(θ0−φ)2
β2
) · ρdρdφ, (2.1)
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where h(Re, Im) is the complex value, which is composed of binary real and imaginary
values according to the sign of the 2D Gabor Wavelet output applied on the image, I,
in the spatial domain. The wavelet sizes of the 2D Gabor Wavelet are α and β on the
radial and angular axes, respectively, of log polar coordinates. The wavelet frequency
on the angular axis is ω, which is 3 octaves inversely proportional to β. Hamming
distance was used to measure the dissimilarity between any two iris templates.
Masek proposed a one dimensional Log-Gabor wavelet on the doubly dimensionless
polar iris image to encode iris texture information [41]. The Log-Gabor Wavelet can
be used as a band pass filter.
G(ω) = e
−log( ωω0 )
2
2log(σ)2 , (2.2)
where σ is the filter bandwidth, and ω0 is the center frequency of the filter. Log-
Gabor filter is designed to remove the high and low frequency components inside the
iris area. A one-dimensional FFT is used to find the frequency characteristics from
−pi to pi radians. The highest and lowest frequencies are removed by using the Log-
Gabor Wavelet that is designed with the previously found parameters. The phase of
each pixel of the polar image filtered with Log-Gabor Wavelet is found for encoding
the iris patterns. A similar approach to Hamming Distance is used to calculate the
similarity between two encoded iris images.
Hollingsworth et al. [42] found that not all of the bits in an iris code generated
by Daugmans method [2, 29] are equally useful. They compared different regions in
the iris area and found that the middle bands of the iris are more consistent than
the inner bands. They also concluded that the inconsistencies are largely due to
the coarse quantization of the phase response. Therefore they generated a Masking
iris code bits corresponding to complex filter responses near the axes of the complex
plane, which is shown to increase the recognition accuracy of Daugmans method in
their experiments.
Velisavljevic [43] used the oriented separable wavelet transforms called direction-
lets to extract the iris features. Directionlets include separable 2-D basis functions
11
of the skewed asymmetric wavelets, which make use of asymmetry and directionality.
Two low pass filters (the horizontal and vertical directions) and four directional high
pass filters (0◦,45◦, 90◦, and 135◦) are applied to filter iris images. The matching
score is calculated by a weighted Hamming distance score between two binary codes.
Miyazawa et al. [44] introduced a phase-correlation-based method for iris recogni-
tion in frequency domain using 2-D Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). They found
that two similar normalized iris images have a distinct sharp peak in the phase corre-
lation function, which can be used as a good similarity measure for image matching.
Krichen et al. [45] found that phase based method can resist the effect of illumi-
nation variations. Therefore, it can be applied to degraded iris images captured in
less cooperative situations. Instead of using DFT phase information, they construct
the phase correlation function based on Gabor phase response for the reason that
Gabor analysis can reflect the possibility of relating spatial information (pixel posi-
tion) to the phase value extracted and can be used to extract information at different
resolutions and orientations.
Thornton et al. [46] proposed an iris recognition technique that uses correlation
filters designed in frequency domain. Their correlation filters are represented by
several training images. A specific filter is designed for each iris class. The matching
is done by performing cross-correlation between the test image and the filter impulse
response. The resulting correlation output should contain a sharp peak if there exists
a good match between the filter and image and no distinct peak if there is no match.
2.1.3.2. DCT Based Recognition Method
Monro et al. [47] proposed an iris feature extraction method based on differences of
discrete cosine transform (DCT) coefficients of overlapped angular patches from nor-
malized iris images. The segmented iris area is transformed and normalized into polar
coordinate. Horizontally aligned overlapping patches in are then selected for feature
extraction. The patches are averaged across width and windowed by a Hanning win-
12
dow. Finally, DCT is applied to the 1-D patch vector. The differences between the
DCT coefficients of adjacent patch vectors are then calculated and a binary code is
generated from their zero crossings. The Hamming Distance is used for matching.
2.1.3.3. Edge Map Based Iris Recognition Method
Wildes et al. [30] proposed use of a Laplacian pyramid to decompose the iris
features for matching. The goodness of matching is measured by applying normalized
correlation to the pair of filtered images.
Sudha et al. [48] proposed a new iris recognition approach based on the Hausdorff
distance measure using edge map of iris images. They introduced a new measure,
called local partial Hausdorff distance, which is computed between the binary edge
maps of normalized iris images. This measure was proved effective in reflect dissim-
ilarity between two images. Moreover, edge map requires less storage space while
increases the recognition speed.
2.1.3.4. Blob Matching Based Approach
Sun et al. [49] proposed using moment-based iris blob matching to nd the spatial
correspondences between the blocks in the input iris image and the enrolled one, and
to quantitatively assess their similarity based on the number of matched block pairs.
They also proposed to use cascaded classifiers to improve the accuracy, especially for
noisy images.
2.1.3.5. Local Descriptor Based Approach
Zhu et al. [50] proposed a system to match iris based on the local scale invariant
features; this method is called the scale invariant feature transform (SIFT) method.
The advantage of this method is that it uses local feature therefore poor segmentation
caused by occlusion or other noise doesnt affect the SIFT process as much.
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Belcher and Du [34] proposed a region based SIFT approach for non-cooperative
iris recognition which works for off-angle iris images. In their method, iris features are
described without a polar transformation, affine transformation, or highly accurate
segmentation and the feature point descriptors are scale and rotation invariant.
2.1.3.6. Quality Measure Incorporated Approach
Ma et al. [51] proposed an iris recognition method using local characteristics of iris
texture variation applied on clear iris images. The proposed iris recognition method
starts with image quality assessment and selection. A quality assessment algorithm
is designed to select the highest quality portion of the iris patterns. Support Vector
Machine is used as a classification mechanism.
Procenca and Alexandre [52] used frontal images of the iris taken in visible light
spectrum. These images are non-ideal because there is more refection noise in the
visible spectrum. Proenca et al. [53] observed that for non-ideal iris images, noise in
one region decreases the iris recognition accuracy dramatically. The authors proposed
dividing the normalized polar image into six regions, and applying a feature extrac-
tion algorithm on each region separately. Each iris has six biometric signatures, and
the matching is performed on corresponding regions of two images separately. The
dissimilarity values for six regions are combined to accept or reject the match. It is
claimed that the proposed iris region division, regional feature extraction and match-
ing method decreased the false rejection rate of the non-cooperative iris recognition
algorithm more than 40%.
Vatsa et al. [54] applied a set of selected quality local enhancement algorithms to
generate a single high-quality iris image. Then they used the 1D-Log Gabor Wavelets-
based texture and topological feature extraction methods to extract the features from
the enhanced image. The binary phase coding and Euler code based.
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2.2 Non-cooperative Iris Recognition
Performing non-cooperative iris recognition is important for a number of potential
tasks, such as video surveillance and watch list monitoring (identifying most wanted
criminals/suspects). In addition, non-cooperative iris recognition systems can provide
more convenience for cooperative users for identification. Non-cooperative iris recog-
nition systems can effectively provide higher throughput therefore especially suited
for applications in populated areas, such as airport, subway station, attractions, etc.
However, non-cooperative iris recognition is still very challenging now due to the dif-
ficulty of locating the iris area accurately and describing the deformed feature prop-
erly. None of the methods reviewed in Section 2.1.3 is designed for non-cooperative
iris recognition.
Some researchers have proposed off-angle iris segmentation algorithms. Daugman
proposed the Fourier active contour approach to model the pupil and iris boundaries
[2]. Shah and Ross [40] proposed a geodesic active contours method to extract the
iris from the surrounding structures, which is proved to be effective in their WVU
non-ideal dataset. Zuo and Schmid proposed a robust segmentation method based on
image painting and contrast balancing [39]. He et al. proposed pulling and pushing
model [55]. In [34], Du et al. proposed a video-based non-cooperative iris image
segmentation scheme that uses a direct least-squares fitting of ellipses method to
model the deformed pupil and limbic boundaries.
For non-frontal iris feature extraction, Daugman proposed using affine transform
to correct the off-angle image and center the gaze [2]. However, this method is
limited because the affine transform assumes the iris is planar, while actually it has
some curvature. Schuckers et al. [56] proposed two methods to calculate angle of
gaze: using Daugmans integro-differential operator and also an angular deformation
calibration model. It needs an accurate estimate of the degree of off-angle and affine
transformation. In [57], Belcher et al. proposed a regional based SIFT method
for non-cooperative iris images. Iris features are described using local feature point
descriptors without polar or affine transform. However, it describes the area around
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a feature point using gradient information, which is not best suited for iris feature;
therefore the accuracy is not high. Later, they introduced a new non-cooperative iris
recognition method based on scale invariant Gabor descriptor [58]. This method can
achieve good results for off-angle and partial iris images; however, it is slow in feature
extraction. A faster feature point selection and description method is needed for real-
time applications. The Gabor Descriptor method will be reviewed in Chapter 2.3 and
the proposed multi-scale feature extraction and matching method for cooperative iris
recognition will be presented in Chapter 3.
2.3 Review of Gabor Descriptor based Method for Non-cooperative Iris Recognition
The currently used iris recognition algorithm in most commercialized systems re-
quires successful iris segmentation and global feature extraction on unwrapped iris
templates, which are very challenging in non-cooperative situations. A possible alter-
native to deal with non-frontal looking and partial image is to locate several interest
points in the partial iris region which are known as feature points. A properly de-
signed local descriptor should be created for each feature points. The feature points
are aligned and their descriptors are compared to generate a matching result.
The Gabor Descriptor method [58] does not require polar transformation, and can
work with low resolution and off-angle iris images. In this method, the iris features are
extracted using a Gabor descriptor. The feature extraction and comparison are scale-
, shift-, rotation- and contrast-invariant. The Gabor wavelet is incorporated with
scale-invariant feature transformation (SIFT) [57] to better extract the iris features.
Both the phase and magnitude of the Gabor wavelet outputs were used in a novel way
for local feature point description. The idea of Gabor Descriptor is the fundament
of the new algorithm in this thesis; therefore we will give a brief review of Gabor
Descriptor.
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2.3.1 Preprocessing
In the preprocessing step, the iris area is segmented from the image (Figure 2.4).
We used direct least square fitting of ellipse method to mathematically model the iris
boundary:
F (a,x) = a · x = ax2 + bxy + cy2 + dx+ ey + f = 0, (2.3)
where a = [a, b, c, d, e, f ]T and x = [x2, xy, y2, x, y, 1]T . Here we use 4ac− b2 = 1 as a
constraint to improve the fitting efficiency and accuracy in high noise data. Then a
window gradient-based method is applied to remove noise in the iris region [34].
Fig. 2.4.: Non-cooperative iris segmentation steps
2.3.2 Feature Point Selection
The Difference of Gaussian (DoG) approach [57] is used to find the potential
feature points which are invariant to scale, shift, rotation and contrast:
D(x, y, s) = G(x, y, s+ 1)−G(x, y, s). (s = 0, 1, 2, 3) (2.4)
G is the result of original image I(x,y) convoluted with Gaussian filter with dif-
ferent parameters:
G(x, y, s) = Gσs · I(x, y). (2.5)
Here,
Gσ(x, y) =
1
2piσ2
e−
x2+y2
2σ2 , (2.6)
gσs =
√
σ20 + σ
2
s , (2.7)
where σ0 = 1.5
√
2 and σ0 = 1.5(
√
2)s.
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The whole iris region is divided in to 720 sub-regions (Figure 2.5). For each sub-
region, one extrema point at most is kept as the feature point. Lowe’s 3-D quadratic
method [59] and the Hessian matrix [60, 61] are used to test if a feature point is a
stable point or not.
Fig. 2.5.: Sub-region map of feature points
2.3.3 Feature Point Description
Each stable feature point is then described using a vector with 64 elements, which
is called a Gabor Descriptor. To create the descriptor for the feature point, a small
window centered on this feature point is used for feature extraction. The window size
is determined as:
W =
⌊√
2 · SA · N + 1
2
+ 0.5
⌋
, (2.8)
where SA = (
√
(x− xp)2 + (y − yp)2) · 2pi360 · 5 and N is the number of bins used to
describe the relative position of a point to a feature point (here N = 4). SA is the
spatial extension of the frame around the feature point (x, y) in the angular direction,
(xp, yp) is the coordinates of pupil center. SA is used to normalize the window around
that feature point and changes in size based on the distance between the feature point
and pupil center.
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A bank of 2-D Gabor filters is then used to extract the iris features. The Gabor
filter in our research has the form:
G(x, y) =
1
2piαβ
exp(−pi((x− x0)
2
α2
+
(y − y0)2
β2
)) · exp(i(ξx+ νy)), (2.9)
where (x0, y0) is the center of the receptive field of the spatial domain, (ξ, ν) is the
frequency of the filter, α, β are the standard deviations of the elliptical Gaussian along
x and y directions.
The magnitude of the filtered area is Gaussian-weighted based on the spatial
distance between each point and the feature point. The phase is divided into 4 areas.
Finally, the weight is summed to form one of the 64 bins based on its spatial location
referred to the feature point (4 x bins and 4 y bins) and phase quadratic (4 phase
orientation bins). The 64 length Gabor Descriptor vector for each feature point is
finally created by normalizing the cumulative weight to a unit vector (Figure 2.6).
The details are shown below. The resulting 64 bin feature point descriptor is then
normalized to a unit vector by dividing by the 2-norm of the descriptor.
Fig. 2.6.: Feature point description
2.3.4 Feature Matching
To match two feature point maps, the average of the distance scores between all
overlapping feature points is calculated and used as the matching score between two
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feature point maps. To make the proposed method be tolerant of segmentation error
and eye rotation, each feature point in a feature point map from image X, is compared
to each feature point in the fifteen surrounding bins (two bins on either side and one
bin above and below) in a feature point map from image Y, and the minimum average
distance score is stored for the two feature point maps compared.
2.3.5 Discussion of Gabor Descriptor
Gabor Descriptor combines the Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) method
and Gabor wavelet. SIFT method is proved to be effective in selecting interest point
and tolerating affine transformation [57], which makes it a possible solution for non-
cooperative or partial iris images. Gabor wavelet is proved to be suited for describing
iris features [28]. It is reasonable that Gabor Descriptor achieves promising accuracy
for non-cooperative iris images. However, there are still concerns and limitations
of this method. First, feature points only from 1 scale are used in this method,
however, in some situations, especially in low quality images, feature points are more
easily to detect and more stable in higher scales. Second, feature points are detected
and described within each sub-region, the overhead of filter convolutions is very high
due to the large number of feature points and filters. This makes the feature point
selection and description parts very slow. Third, there is no template protection
scheme applied to the generated template, which could be a serious issue in real-life
applications.
Based on the pros and cons of Gabor Descriptor, a newly designed feature point
selection, description and matching algorithm is presented in Chapter 3.1. The pro-
posed algorithm extracts more information from scale space and uses a multi-scale
matching scheme. A series of approximations are applied to the feature point se-
lection and description part to increase the speed. The experimental results on two
databases are presented and compared to Gabor Descriptor and other methods in
Chapter 3.2.
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2.4 Local Descriptor
Existing local region descriptors such as SIFT [59] or GLOH [62] have been proved
to be more effective and robust than global correlation methods under perspective
and illumination changes. Moreover, for non-cooperative iris recognition, it is much
easier to pair two set of local sparse points than align two deformable iris regions
globally. The discrimination power of the local descriptor is highly correlated with
the recognition accuracy, therefore how to properly design a descriptor is crucial.
2.4.1 SURF Descriptor
Speed Up Robust Features (SURF) presented by Bay et al. [63] has been proved an
effective local descriptor and has been widely used in objects recognition and tracking.
SURF descriptor describes each feature point by calculating the distribution of pixel
intensities in a scale dependent neighborhood, which is very similar to SIFT [59].
However, SURF descriptor makes use of the integral image and the box-like Haar
wavelet to decrease computing time.
The descriptor extraction can be divided into two steps. First, an orientation is
assigned to each feature point to achieve rotation invariant. A circular SURF window
is constructed first around each feature point. The size of the window is determined by
the scale of the feature point. The response to Haar wavelet in both x and y directions
are found for each pixel in the circular window. The orientation is calculated from
the above Haar response and Gaussian weighted by the distance between each pixel
and feature point. The orientation is estimated by the voting result of all pixels lying
in the window to create a rotation invariant descriptor. This step is optional for some
applications that do not require image rotation invariant very much. In this thesis,
the orientation is used to pair two feature points in the multi-scale matching process.
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The second step is to calculate the descriptor component. The aforementioned
SURF window is divided into 4x4 sub-regions, and a 4-length-vector is calculated and
extracted from the Haar response for each sub-region:
Vsub = [
∑
dx,
∑
dy,
∑
|dx| ,
∑
|dy|], (2.10)
where dx, dy are response to horizontal and vertical filter respectively. Finally a
64(4×4×4) length descriptor is generated for each feature point as SURF descriptor
(Figure 2.7).
Fig. 2.7.: SURF descriptor
Unlike SIFT, the descriptor component calculation does not contain a spatial
weighting scheme. All gradient attributed equally to the descriptor.
2.4.2 DAISY Descriptor
DAISY descriptor proposed by Tola et al. [64] are inspired by SIFT and GLOH
but can be computer much faster. The efficiency is achieved by convolving orienta-
tion maps to computer each bin value of the descriptor using Gaussian. A global
orientation map is pre-calculated and stored for each image. Thus there is no need
to repeat the gradient histogram calculation during the descriptor generation.
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For a given image I, H orientation maps Gi with the same size as I are computed
first. H is the number of quantized orientations. The orientation map is computed
using the image gradient norm: for each location Go(x, y) of the orientation map,
Go(x, y) = max(
∂I
∂o
, 0). (2.11)
Only the horizontal and vertical gradient ∂I
∂x
, ∂I
∂y
need to be computer using kernel
[1, 0,−1] and [1, 0,−1]T . other orientation norms can be directly derived using:
Gθ = max(cos θ
∂I
∂x
+ sin θ
∂I
∂y
, 0). (2.12)
Each orientation map is then convolved with a set of Gaussian kernels H with
different standard deviation σ. The Gaussian convolved maps can be computed very
conveniently in a cascade way:
GΣ2o = H
Σ2 ·Go = HΣ ·HΣ1 ·Go = HΣ ·GΣ1o (2.13)
with Σ =
√
Σ22 − Σ21.
Based on the feature point location, a DAISY descriptor shown in Figure 2.8 is
created. The size of the circle stands for the standard deviation of the convolved
Gaussian kernel. the * sign is the location of feature point and the + sign is location
of the central pixel of the sample region around each feature point. The overlapping
regions guarantee the smooth transitions between different regions. The orientation
is determined by the radial direction and quantized into one of the eight orientations
of DAISY descriptor. (Figure 2.8)
2.4.3 Gabor Descriptor
2D Gabor wavelet has widely been used in feature extraction and object recog-
nition. Daugman discovered that simple cells in the visual cortex of mammalian
brains can be modeled by Gabor functions [28]. Thus, image analysis by the Gabor
functions is similar to perception in the human visual system. Moreover, 2D Gabor
filter has been proved very effective in iris feature extraction. Therefore, a filter bank
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consisting of Gabor filters with various scales and rotations is created and applied in
this research (Figure 2.9).
Fig. 2.8.: DAISY descriptor for non-cooperative iris
Fig. 2.9.: Examples of Gabor filters with different sizes and orientations.
By properly designing the parameter, a suitable Gabor filter bank is created for
each detected feature point. The orientation of the Gabor filter is rotated in ac-
cordance with the radial direction of the feature point. A 4x4 neighborhood of the
feature point is included for Gabor Descriptor (Figure 2.10).
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Fig. 2.10.: Gabor window and its 4x4 bins
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3. SPEED-UP MULTI-STAGE NON-COOPERATIVE IRIS
RECOGNITION
3.1 Speed-up Multi-Stage Non-cooperative Iris Recognition
Gabor Descriptor searches possible interest points within each sub-region. The
DoG approach and hessian matrix based interest detection requires tons of convolu-
tion operations, which greatly increase the template generation time. Therefore only
3 different scales are used in Gabor Descriptor method, e.g. all the detect feature
points are from only scale 2. The trade-off between the feature point completeness
and running time may possibly reduce the discriminability of the generated Gabor
Descriptor template. In this Chapter, a speed-up version of the Gabor Descriptor is
introduced. Multi-scale feature extraction and matching scheme is applied to enhance
the feature point repeatability increase the feature information.
3.1.1 Overview
The currently used iris recognition algorithm in most commercialized systems re-
quires successful iris segmentation and global feature extraction on unwrapped iris
templates, which are very challenging in non-cooperative situations. A possible alter-
native to deal with non-frontal looking and partial images is to locate several interest
points in the partial iris region which are known as feature points. A properly de-
signed local descriptor should be created for each feature point. The feature points
are aligned and their descriptors are compared to generate a matching result.
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The flowchart of the proposed approach is shown in Figure 3.1. During the en-
rollment, the off-angle iris is segmented using our non-cooperative iris segmentation
method. A multi-scale feature point selection algorithm is then directly applied to
the segmented iris region. Local descriptor is generated based on the information
around each feature point. Finally a multi-scale template is generated for each eye
and stored in the database. During identification, the same segmentation and fea-
ture extraction methods are applied to the test image and a multi-scale template is
generated. The generated template is compared with all templates enrolled in the
database using a multi-scale matching algorithm to find the closest match. We will
introduce the proposed approach step by step next.
3.1.2 Multi-scale Feature Point Selection
The filter convolution operation is very time-consuming. For example, an nxn
filter convolution needs n2 multiplications and n2 − 1 additions, which leads to a
O(n2) complexity. With the increase of filter size, the calculation time soars up. The
integral image and box filter approximation similar to SURF method [63] are used
here to speed up the filter convolution.
The integral image is computed rapidly from an input image and is used to speed
up the calculation of any upright rectangular area. The integral image is generated by
summing the entire pixel values between each pixel and the origin. For example, give
an image I and a point (x, y), the value at (x, y) of the integral image I is calculated
by the formula:
IΣ =
i≤x∑
i=0
j≤y∑
j=0
I(x, y). (3.1)
The convolution of an image I with an n×n box filter with value f at point (x, y)
can be implemented by only four operations using integral image IΣ:
Iconv(x, y) = f · ((A+D)− (B + C)), (3.2)
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where A,B,C,D is the value of the four corners of the convolved regions in integral
image IΣ: (Figure 3.2)
A = IΣ(x−
⌊n
2
⌋
, y −
⌊n
2
⌋
) (3.3)
B = IΣ(x+
⌊n
2
⌋
, y −
⌊n
2
⌋
) (3.4)
C = IΣ(x−
⌊n
2
⌋
, y +
⌊n
2
⌋
) (3.5)
D = IΣ(x+
⌊n
2
⌋
, y +
⌊n
2
⌋
). (3.6)
Fig. 3.2.: Filter convolution using integral image
To locate the interest points in multi-scale space, a scale-space needs to be created
first. The traditional approach to constructing a scale-space is to change the image
size and the Gaussian filter is repeatedly applied to smooth subsequent layers 3.3.
This method requires a great many of convolutions and image resizing operations.
To speed up this process, the Gaussian filter is approximated to a box filter only
containing blocks of several values (Figure 3.5). Moreover, instead of changing the
image size, the scale-space is created by convolving the unchanged image with a set of
consecutively changed box filters (Figure 3.5). The filter size is decided by the scale
of the points it detects 3.4:
filtersize = 3 · (2σ + 1). (3.7)
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Fig. 3.3.: Construct scale space using Gaussian pyramid
Fig. 3.4.: Construct scale space using filter pyramid
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Fig. 3.5.: Approximated box filter structure
To locate the interest points, The Fast Hessian Detector [63] is used to find the
potential feature points which are invariant to scale, shift, rotation and contrast. In
order to accelerate this process, a similar set of box filters as in [63] is applied to
approximate the Gaussian second order derivatives (Figure 3.6). For each point X =
(x,y) in image, the Hessian matrix of X at scale becomes:
H(x, y, σ) = [
Dxx(x, y, σ) Dxy(x, y, σ)
Dxy(x, y, σ) Dyy(x, y, σ)
], (3.8)
where Dxx, Dyy, Dxy are the convolutions of 3 approximated box filters with image in
X. The points with positive hessian determinant value and greater than a threshold
are selected as candidate feature points:
Det(H(x, y, σ)) = Dxx(x, y, σ) ·Dyy(x, y, σ)− 0.92D2xy(x, y, σ). (3.9)
All the candidate points are then compared to its 26 neighbors in a 3 × 3 × 3
volume in scale space. The local maximum points are kept. (Figure 3.7)
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Fig. 3.6.: Approximated Gaussian filters for calculating Hessian matrix.
Fig. 3.7.: Local maximum point selection.
The final step is to interpolate the selected interest points in both spatial and
scale to achieve sub-pixel accuracy. Brown’s 3D quadratic method [65] is then used
to interpolate each feature point in scale space:
D(∆x¯) = D +
∂DT
∂x¯
∆x¯+
1
2
(∆x¯)T
∂2D
∂x¯2
∆x¯, (3.10)
whereD and its derivatives are evaluated at the selected point and ∆x¯ = (∆x,∆y,∆σ)T
is the offset from this point. Taking the derivative of this function with respect to x¯
and setting it equal to zero, we determine the extremum, ∆x¯, to be:
∆x˜ = −∂
2D−1
∂x¯2
· ∂D
∂x¯
. (3.11)
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The refined location of the interest point is adjusted by ∆x˜ if any of ∆x,∆y,∆ is
greater than 0.5. The interpolation process is repeated until ∆x˜ is less than 0.5 in all
the three directions.
For each sub-region divided in [58], at most one feature point is kept as the feature
point. The one with the largest hessian determinant value is kept as the final feature
point of this sub-region.
3.1.3 Multi-scale Local Descriptors
In [58], we developed the Gabor descriptor method. However, this method is slow
and more importantly, detected feature points only from 1 scale are used in Gabor
descriptor method, however, in some situations, especially in low quality images,
feature points are more easily to detect and more stable in higher scales. In this
research, we construct the scale space by subsequently convolving the image with
a series of approximated box filters with different sizes. The convolution is done by
applying the integral image, which greatly reduces the computation time. Within each
scale, several feature points are located and described to generate a scale specified
local descriptor. The local descriptors created at different scales compose the multi-
scale descriptor for each iris (Figure 3.8).
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Three kinds of local descriptors are selected or designed for non-cooperative iris
recognition in this thesis: SURF descriptor, DAISY descriptor and Gabor Descriptor.
The first two descriptors owe much of their strength to the use of gradient orientation
histogram, which are relatively robust to distortion. SURF descriptor makes use of
the Haar wavelet and the efficiency of integral image while DAISY descriptor takes
much more correlated regions and orientations into consideration. In contrast, Gabor
Descriptor relies on the response of the iris image to 2D-Gabor wavelet and created
a phase based magnitude histogram. Their experimental results are compared in
Chapter 3.2.
3.1.4 Feature Point Pairing and Multi-stage Matching
After generating local descriptor for each feature point, Two 10×72 feature maps
is generated for the iris regions similar to Chapter 2.3. The two feature maps have
5 degree different to tolerate segmentation error and to enhance the robustness of
the detected feature point location. While matching two irises, the feature points
in two templates are paired based on the sub-region they belong to. To be tolerant
of segmentation errors and eye rotation or dilation, during registration, each feature
point is compared to its corresponding point and its neighbors in the other comparing
template. Therefore multiple registrations are possible.
A multi-stage matching scheme is applied to each pair of compared templates
after alignment (Figure 3.9).Feature points are paired by aligning two sub-region
maps. At stage I matching, large scale points are paired and the paired point number
is compared to a threshold. Only two irises with enough paired large scale points
are kept to stage II matching, where the two multi-scale descriptors are compared to
generate the final matching score.
We pair the feature points in two templates based on the sub-region they belong to.
To be tolerant of segmentation errors and eye rotation or dilation, during registration,
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each feature point is compared to its corresponding point and its neighbors in the
other comparing template. Therefore multiple registrations are possible.
Fig. 3.9.: The proposed multi-stage matching scheme
Due to the stableness of the feature point extraction process, the feature points can
be used as an important factor to determine iris class. In non-cooperative situations,
it is common that iris images are not well focused, which may increase the difficulty
of detecting detailed iris pattern at small scales. This will cause problems for feature
points matching since the feature points detected at small scale may vary a lot.
However, at large scales, we found that two irises from the same class remain a high
stability in feature point locations. Therefore in the stage I matching, we separate
the feature point pairs by their scale and check the feature points detected at large
scales first(scale 3 to scale 5 in our experiment). If the number of repeated large scale
feature points of all possible registrations is less than a threshold, these two irises are
directly viewed as two different classes. In our research, the threshold is set to be 25%
of the total large scale feature point number, which is proved to be very effective in
reducing false acceptance without increasing too many false rejections. Two examples
of feature points pairing at different scales are shown in Figure 3.10; we can see that
these two images from the same iris maintain a high repeatability in feature point
locations at large scales feature points (paired in red line) while the imposter iris is
directly rejected after the stage I match since there are not enough detected feature
points pairings. The size of the circle stands for scale and color of the circle stands
for the sign of the trace of Hessian matrix.
After the large scale feature point check in stage I matching, if the number of
the paired large scale feature points is larger than the threshold, stage II matching
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is followed. All feature points are paired based on their sub-region locations, scale,
SURF orientation and the sign of the trace of Hessian matrix. Only if all the above
information of two feature points is in accordance with each other, the pairing is
valid. Two aligned irises are compared by checking the matching distance of the
descriptors of all the overlapping feature points in stage II matching. For all possible
registrations, the smallest average Euclidean distance of feature point matching pairs
is the matching distance between the two images. The matching distance is used to
further determine the iris class.
3.2 Experimental Results
3.2.1 Database
Two databases are used in the following experiments: IUPUI Remote Iris Image
Database and ICE 2005 Database. The IUPUI Remote Iris Image Database was
acquired at 10.3 feet from the camera to the subject using a MicroVista NIR camera
with Fujinon zoom lens. The database includes 3690 remote iris images of 31 users
in 6 directions (look left, look center, look right, look up-left, look up, look up-right)
(Figure 3.11). 6 videos were captured for each subject with different scenarios: frontal
look (1st video); reading from posters 15 feet from the subject and 5 feet behind the
camera (2nd and 3rd videos; searching the wall to count the number of occurrences
of a certain symbol (4th and 5th videos); and performing simple calculations using
numbers posted on the ceiling (6th video). Each video was acquired at 30 frames per
second with 1280x1024 resolutions. The average iris radius of the video images in the
database is 95 pixels. During the image acquisition, subjects can move their heads and
eyes freely to perform the tasks, which simulates a remote, non-cooperative situation,
such as when a subject looks at flight times at an airport. In addition, the subjects can
have their own emotions (smile etc.) during the acquisition process. Since there is no
public available database particularly for non-cooperative iris recognition currently,
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(a) A Genuine Match Example
(b) An Imposter Match Example Match
Fig. 3.10.: Feature points pairing at different scales and multi-scale matching
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we collected this dataset to measure the performance of our non-cooperative iris
recognition methods.
(a) Look Left (b) Look Center (c) Look Right
(d) Look Up-Left (e) Look Up (f) Look Up-Right
Fig. 3.11.: IUPUI remote iris image database: multiple angles [58]
Fig. 3.12.: ICE 2005 database [66]
The ICE 2005 Database [66] from National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) consists mostly of frontal look eyes (Figure 3.12). It includes two sub-
databases: a left iris image database with 1527 images from 120 subjects, and a right
iris image database with 1426 images from 124 subjects. In this experiment, we used
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the more challenging left eyes. The ICE 2005 Database is mainly used to measure the
performance of our methods working in cooperative situation and to compare with
other currently popularly used methods.
3.2.2 Experimental Results in Non-cooperative Situation
For the IUPUI remote iris image database, we used the ICE 2005 matching proto-
col in this experiment: each image is matched against all other images in the database.
Therefore, all 3690 images were used in our experiment, comprising 6.8 million com-
parisons in the matching stage. We choose Gabor descriptor as the local descriptor to
describe each feature point. We compare our proposed method with regional based
SIFT method [57] and our previous Gabor descriptor method [58]. Figure 3.13 shows
the comparison of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve between Gabor de-
scriptor and our proposed method. The accuracy statistics of 3 methods are shown
in Table 3.1. We can see that our proposed method achieves a 3.10% equal error rate
(EER) and outperforms the other two previous non-cooperative iris recognition meth-
ods. The accuracy is increased due to the great reduction in false acceptance. The
feature extraction of the proposed methods is 5 times speed up than Gabor descriptor
method with increased recognition accuracy.
To ensure the accuracy, it will be important to have multiple enrollment images
with different eye-looking angle in non-cooperative situation. Therefore, we also con-
duct a video based multiple iris fusion experiment. The identity is determined by a
majority vote of all the recognized frames of each video. In this experiment, 10 im-
ages per eye were used from the first acquisition session for enrollment. They include
the different off-angles (left, right, up-left, up-right, and up). The total number of
enrollment images is 620 with 62 irises from 31 subjects. We automatically match
the enrollment images with the video frames in the 5 videos for each person from the
second acquisition session (the frontal look only video was excluded as they are all
frontal images) for 30 subjects and 60 irises, altogether 298 videos. We achieve 100%
40
recognition accuracy (0% FAR at 0% FRR). The results show that 100% accuracy
can be obtained using multiple enrollment images, video sequences of an iris, and
fusion of matching results; even in a non-cooperative iris database.
Fig. 3.13.: ROC curves comparison of IUPUI database
Table 3.1: Comparison of three methods using IUPUI non-cooperative database
Algorithm EER GAR at FAR = 0.1% GAR at FAR = 0.01%
Regional SIFT [57] 5.88% 80.24% 67.63%
Gabor descriptor [58] 4.78% 89.66% 84.76%
Propose method 3.10% 92.20% 88.20%
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3.2.3 Experimental Results in Cooperative Situation
We also measure the proposed algorithm in cooperative situation. We use the 1527
left eyes of ICE Database, which provides 1165101 comparisons. Gabor Descriptor
is used for feature point description. The ROC curves of the all to all matching
are shown in Figure 3.14. The proposed method outperforms our previous Gabor
Descriptor based method. It is mainly due to the reason that the multi-scale matching
algorithm can eliminate a lot of false matching at stage I matching. The proposed
method is also compared with traditional method for frontal looking iris, 2D Gabor
wavelet method [29] and 1D log-Gabor wavelet method [41] (Table 3.2). The same
segmentation results are used for all the methods. The pupil and limbic boundaries
are modeled as a circle, which is a simple and reasonable approximation of the pupil
and limbic boundaries geometries for frontal looking eyes. We can see that our method
can still achieve comparable results as the most accurate algorithms for cooperative
iris recognition.
Fig. 3.14.: ROC curves comparison of ICE 2005 database
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Table 3.2: Comparison of four methods using ICE 2005 left eyes
Algorithm EER GAR at FAR = 0.1% GAR at FAR = 0.01%
2D Gabor [29] 1.26% 97.50% 96.29%
1D log-Gabor [41] 1.06% 97.39% 95.33%
Gabor Descriptor[58] 2.57% 93.16% 89.16%
Propose method 1.19% 97.20% 94.50%
To further justify the discriminability of our designed local descriptor, three differ-
ent local descriptors (SURF, DAISY and Gabor) are applied to left eyes of ICE 2005
Database. The same set of feature points are detected and described using Gabor
Descriptor, SURF Descriptor and DAISY Descriptor respectively. The comparison
of ROC curves are shown in Figure 3.15. Obviously, Gabor Descriptor based local
descriptor works better than the other two gradient based local descriptors. The
main reason is because SURF and DAISY descriptor describe feature points using
local gradient magnitude and angle information, whereas Gabor Descriptor encodes
feature information around feature points using the magnitude and phase response
of 2-D Gabor wavelets which is more capable of capturing iris feature characteristics.
The detailed statistic results of the three local descriptors are listed in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Comparison of three descriptors using ICE left eyes
Descriptor EER GAR at FAR = 0.1% GAR at FAR = 0.01%
Traditional SURF approach 5.99% 74.77% 61.03%
DAISY 9.41% 57.08% 40.53%
Proposed method 1.19% 97.20% 94.50%
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Fig. 3.15.: ROC curve comparison of three local descriptors
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4. REVIEW OF BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE PROTECTION
In this chapter, Attacking on the biometric template is discussed and biometric
template protection methods are categorized and analyzed.
Attack against the templates stored in database or during the matching process
is considered to be one of the most potential threats to the traditional biometric
systems. The intrusion into the template database may lead to serious consequences.
Jain et al. [20] summarized three vulnerabilities related to attacks on templates:
(i) an imposter can replace with a stolen template to gain unauthorized access. (ii)
fake or replicated biometric patterns can be created to spoof the system. (iii) the
stolen template can be replayed. Once the templates are stolen or tampered, it is
possible that all the services relying on the same biometric pattern are in danger,
which is known as the function creep [67]. Moreover, since biometric templates are
usually highly connected to the user privacy and some of the personal information
is sensitive, such as ethnic, gender, or the disease one is suffering from [68], privacy
risks of the traditional biometric systems are of greater concern. The templates
protection methods can mainly be categorized as the crypto and cancelable biometric
approach. The first idea originated from the crypto community, combining biometrics
with traditional standard cryptographic methods [69,70]. However, as we know, these
algorithms (e.g. MD5) give totally different outputs even if their inputs are very
close. In particular, these methods require extracting non-changing patterns from
biometric data, which is often challenging. Therefore the design of a robust hashing
algorithm to better tolerate the within-class variance of biometric templates while
discriminating between-class distance is necessary. To solve these challenges, several
types of methods have been proposed by the crypto community.
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One popularly used method is biometric hardening or bioHashing [71–74]. The
feature template is combined with user specific random information in order to be
projected to a new representation. An error-tolerant discretization method is then
used to quantize the feature description to reduce uncertainty. The projection acts
like a linear transformation of the biometric pattern. It can protect the true template
and ensure high security since the user specific random information can be generated
using different keys, which ensures the revocability of the templates. Moreover, the
introduction of user key can further increase the discriminability of the templates.
However, external randomness needs to be stored in a smart card or a token, making
it inconvenient in large scale applications. If the key is compromised, the scheme is
insecure since the projection process is usually invertible. It is also noticeable that
intrauser variation may reduce the stability of this scheme.
Key-binding [75–79] is another popular scheme in cryptosystem to protect the
security of both biometric template and cryptographic key. This method depends on
storing a helper data obtained by binding a key (which is independent of biometric
template) with the biometric template [20]. Notice that the helper data should not
reveal too much information about the key or biometric template. This scheme is
considered to be non-invertible since it is computationally infeasible to decode the
key or biometric template without knowing the biometric data. In [75], Juels and
Wattenberg proposed the idea of fuzzy commitment which incorporates error cor-
rection code with local biometric features to tolerate the within-class variance. The
method is proved to be effective in tolerating biometric data variations. However,
it does not work well when substantial re-ordering happens in the biometric feature
vector among different authentications, which is very common in biometric templates.
Later, Juels and Sudan proposed the fuzzy vault [76] approach, which is an order-
invariant version of fuzzy commitment. Note that this error correction based fuzzy
scheme is first designed for a cryptosystem, but it is particularly suited for biometric
data and biometric template protection. Therefore, it is often used in conjunction
with other template protection methods, such as biometric hardening to achieve can-
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celability [79]. However, current fuzzy vault scheme has some limitations; we will
address this issue later in Chapter 5.
Another type of similar scheme is categorized as key-generation [80–84]. In con-
trast with the key-binding method, the helper data of key-generation scheme is only
derived from the biometric traits and the cryptographic key is directly generated from
the help data. The ideas of secure sketch and fuzzy extractor introduced by Dodis
et al. [80] is an example design of key-generation cryptosystem. The secure sketch is
the helper data extracted from the original biometric patterns which leaks limited in-
formation of the biometric data while the fuzzy extractor can generate cryptographic
key from the biometric features. However, Simoens et al. [68] show that the attack
on the fuzzy template protecting scheme is possible. In particular, it is possible for
attacker to determine whether two documents are encrypted using the same biometric
data. Even this does not mean that the biometric templates are compromised, but it
is still a potential threat to user privacy. In addition, the stableness and diversity of
the generated key cannot be easily achieved simultaneously [20].
The idea of cancelable biometrics [19] is proposed by Ratha et al.. This type
of system implements cancelability by designing methods to transform the true sig-
nal and create alternatives for matching. These methods can be divided into two
categories: one tries to mask the original patterns by mixing artificial texture or
noise, which they called salting [85–88]. The other uses some non-invertible transfor-
mations to distort the original biometric patterns [89–92]. All these transformation
functions are considered to be non-invertible since they are relying on some one-way
functions which are easy to compute but hard to invert in polynomial time even if
the attackers steal the transformed template and/or transformation key. Compare to
other template protection methods, cancelable biometrics can preserve the biometric
representation. The main concern of this type of methods focuses on whether the
transform functions can preserve the discriminability of the biometric templates.
The comparison of the above four categories of methods are shown in Table 4.1
and all their advantages and disadvantages are listed in Table 4.2 [93].
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Table 4.1: Comparison of different biometric template protection methods
Stored
entity
Preserve
representation
Template
stableness
Revocable
Biometric
Hardening
Transformed
template and key
No Medium Yes
Key-binding Helper data No High No
Key-generation Helper data No Low No
Cancelable
Transform
Transformed
template
Yes High Yes
Table 4.2: Summary of different biometric template protection methods
Advantages Disadvantages
Biometric
Hardening
Easy to revoke and reissue
Increase the discriminability
Invertible
Original biometric can be
recovered by the attacker
if key is lost
Key-binding
Non-invertible
High template stableness
Not cancelable
Still leak some information
High FRR
Key-generation
Non-invertible
Directly generate key
from biometric patterns
Stableness and diversity
of the generated key can not
be achieved simultaneously
Cancelable
Transform
Keep representation
Can be applied to raw data
Easy to revoke and reissue
Non-invertible
Reduce the discriminability
Reduce accuracy
48
5. SECURE ENHANCED DESIGNS FOR
NON-COOPERATION IRIS RECOGNITION
In this chapter, two secure enhanced designs for the non-cooperative iris recog-
nition method in Chapter 3 are introduced to secure the iris template respectively:
key incorporation based cancelable non-cooperative iris recognition and key-binding
based cancelable non-cooperative iris recognition. The experimental results and re-
lated discussions are presented in Chapter 5.3.
5.1 Key Incorporation Based Cancelable Iris Recognition
In different from the traditional cancelable iris recognition methods which the
key information is independent of the feature information. In this key incorpora-
tion scheme, we propose the partial-key information incorporation based cancelable
iris recognition method. It is a non-invertible transformation. Figure 5.1 shows the
system architecture. During Enrollment, a set of enrollment images is collected and
preprocessed. The feature selection and description algorithms introduced in Chapter
3 are applied to each preprocessed iris pattern. A unique non-invertible transform
method controlled by a random kernel is then carried out on each users Gabor De-
scriptor templates. Here we give a simple implementation of this random kernel: the
user provides a key as a seed to a pseudo-random number generator which is used to
create the random kernel. Thus, templates from the same user will have the same
unique transformation. Finally, the transformed cancelable templates are stored in a
database [94,95].
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Fig. 5.1.: Proposed key incorporation cancelable scheme
During authentication (Figure 5.1), the user is asked to provide the user key to
the system. The same feature selection and description algorithm is then applied to
the preprocessed testing images. The user key produces the same seed to the pseudo-
random number generator to realize a unique non-invertible transformation. Finally,
two Gabor Descriptor templates are compared in a transformed domain to make a
decision. Therefore if the transformed templates are compromised, the key can be
reissued and the compromising would not affect the original templates.
5.1.1 Incorporating the Key Information
In this research, we used the fact that the ring information r can reflect key
information and it is non-reversible. With this new feature information, the feature
descriptor becomes a 65-length vector (64 bins plus the ring information). (an example
is shown in Figure 5.2)
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Fig. 5.2.: 65-length descriptor with ring information
The r information is actually the radial position in the sub-region map of each
feature point. In order to enhance the template security and create cancelable tem-
plate, a re-arrangement of the sub-region is needed. Before re-arrangement, the radial
position of each feature point in sub-region map is recorded in r field added to the
Gabor Descriptor. The re-arrangement is uniquely determined by a user key, which
means a correct key provided should maintain the same re-arrangement. No mat-
ter how the transformation goes, the overlapping feature in original sub-region map
should be still overlapping after re-arrangement. Thus, the recorded radial position
of the overlapping feature point in both transformed templates should have the same
r value. By checking the correspondence of the r values of each overlapping feature
point in both test and enrolled templates, we can quickly get rid of the wrong user
key situations. The key information is incorporated with the iris pattern and we do
not directly compare the user key so there is less room for the attacker to get the
key information. Moreover, the added r information will not leak the true template
information because one cannot reverse the transform process only with the radial
position in the sub-region map provided. Also, the key could not be fully recovered
from the extracted key information.
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5.1.2 Non-invertible Transformation
The transformation process is a non-invertible spatial transformation consisting
of a random re-mapping of the 720 bins to shuﬄe the original location. Therefore
theoretically 720! (over 104200) different transformations can be obtained. To be
tolerant of segmentation error and provide redundancy, feature points located within
a 3×5 neighborhood region are considered to be overlapping during matching. In our
research, In order to make the re-mapping non-invertible, we only use part of the bins
(N < 720) from the original templates which contains all the feature points so that
the information for recognition will not be reduced. Therefore the true arrangement
number is much less than the theoretical one. (For example, 100 valid feature points
can get N!/(N-100)! different permutations). Even though, the number of possible
arrangements is still enough to ensure a potential attacker has a negligible probability
of guessing the arrangement of the original template using a brute-force attack.
In order to transform the original mapping arrangement, the user provides a ran-
dom seed for a pseudo-random number generator. This seed may be generated by a
physical hardware token that the user keeps in her possession; this provides a complex
random seed in a secure manner. The results of the pseudo-random number gener-
ator are applied to a transformation process that re-maps each of the sub-regions
from the original mapping arrangement into the newly transformed mapping. The
transformation process re-maps the arrangement of the sub-regions, while leaving the
contents of the 64-length descriptor in each sub-region unchanged from the original
mapping. To realize the 720-bin random permutation, a 128-bit sequence is gener-
ated from each users pin or token as an input seed, as well as a set of encryption keys
for the pseudo-random number generator. A one way hash encryption function or
DES-based method can be used to map the input seed into 720 128-bit strings using
the ANSI X9.17 pseudo-random number generator algorithm [96] below.
The 720 bit string sequence constitutes a unique random permutation applied
to the original Gabor Descriptor templates. The pseudo-random number generator
will produce the same numeric sequence when used with the same seed during a fu-
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ture transformation process. This allows for subsequently generated iris mappings to
undergo the same transformation, producing a consistently transformed mapping ar-
rangement for matching. Even if the attacker gets the original template arrangement,
that is just a part of the iris; the system can regenerate a new pin. The correspond-
ing templates in the enrollment database should be deleted and the user should be
re-enrolled in the database to achieve cancelability.
Algorithm 1 ANSI x9.17 pseudo-random number generator
For i = 1 : m
xi = Ek(I ⊕ s);
s = Ek(xi ⊕ s);
End
Return (x1, x2, . . . , xm)
I– initial value, s – input seed provided by user key, Ek – one-way encryption
function controlled by encryption key extracted from user’s pin or token.
5.1.3 Matching with a New Added Field
To match two feature point maps, the average of the distance scores between all
overlapping feature points is calculated and used as the matching score between two
feature point maps. To make the proposed method tolerant of segmentation error and
eye rotation, each feature point in a feature point map from image X, is compared to
each feature point in the fifteen surrounding bins (two bins on either side and one bin
above and below) in a feature point map from image Y, and the minimum average
distance score is stored for the two feature point maps compared.
In addition, we modified the Euclidean distance based matching algorithm by
taking the transformation into consideration. For both enrolled and test images from
a same user with the same key, the unique transformed mapping should be the same.
During matching, any overlapping blocks of the transformed templates should also
be overlapped in the original templates. Thus, we add a field which only records the
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ring number of the bin to provide location information of this feature point. Before
calculating the Euclidean distance, we check the feature point location information.
If several blocks are found to be too far away, we view the two templates as being
from different users and move on to the next comparison. The similarity (from 0 to
1) of two images X, Y is calculated as:
Sim(X, Y ) = (X.r1 == Y.r1) ·(X.r2 == Y.r2) · · · · ·(X.rm == Y.rm) ·
√√√√ 64∑
i=1
(Xi − Yi)2,
(5.1)
where X.rm and Y.rm are the ring location number of the mth overlapping block in
both X and Y . An attacker cannot recover the original permutation with only the
radius location information. Thus, with the added ring number, we can shorten our
matching time and reduce the false acceptance rate greatly without compromising
the security of the original templates.
In the matching process, there could be four possible scenarios: the two templates
for matching could be from:
• Same user and same key : The two templates should be matched.
• Same user and different keys : The template matching distance would be high
because the transformations are different and the two templates should not be
matched.
• Different users and same key : The template matching distance would be high
because iris patterns are different (i.e. Gabor Descriptors would be different so
the distance will be high).
• Different users and different keys : The template matching distance would be
high because both the iris patterns and the transformations are different. Under
such a scenario, the false acceptance rate will be reduced dramatically.
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5.2 Key-binding Based Cancelable Iris Recognition
To implement the key-binding based cancelable non-cooperative iris recognition,
the fuzzy vault scheme is combined with the large scale feature point detection and
description to enhance the iris template security. The high stability of the large scale
point location from two irises from the same class can be utilized as the mutual infor-
mation required by fuzzy vault scheme. However, the traditional fuzzy vault scheme
has some limitations. Some of the limitations will be analyzed and addressed by the
proposed design in this Chapter 5.2.1. The proposed fuzzy vault implementation for
biometric template protection is introduced in Chapter 5.2.2.
5.2.1 Fuzzy Vault Scheme
Fuzzy vault scheme [76] proposed by Juels and Wattenberg is a cryptographic
construction specifically suited for biometrics. A player Alice may place a secret key
k in a fuzzy vault and lock it use a set of elements from a universal field. In order
to retrieve the secret key k from the locked fuzzy vault, another player Bob has to
present his set of elements which is substantially overlapped with that of Alice to
unlock the fuzzy vault. Thus, fuzzy stands for the fuzziness of the set of elements
held by every player. The player who wants to unlock the vault and obtain the secret
key does not need to present the exactly same set with the one used for locking. A
small portion of fuzziness and variation is allowed.
Due to the variations of signal acquisition situations, the acquired biometric signals
from the same user are not exactly identical every time. The fuzziness of the biometric
signal can be utilized to construct a fuzzy vault, which is a typical design of key-
binding biometric template. The generated key-binding template (vault) is referred as
helper data in the key-binding based biometric template security protection schemes.
The helper data is the only information stored in the database, which leaks negligible
information of the true biometric template. In this way, the privacy and security of
users biometric template is secured.
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Fig. 5.3.: Traditional fuzzy vault scheme
A formal description of the fuzzy vault scheme is shown in Figure 5.3. During the
fuzzy vault locking, a locking set
Block = {Block 1, Block 2, . . . , Block n} (5.2)
is extracted from the enrolled biometric signal. A private key K is stored in the
vault in the following way: assuming K is a 128-bit AES key; the key is then divided
into 16 8-bit binary strings. A polynomial P of degree 15 is constructed using the
previous 16 binary number as its coefficients. The locking set Block is evaluated using
the polynomial and a genuine locking set
T = {(Block 1, P (Block 1)), (Block 2, P (Block 2)), . . . , (Block n, P (Block n)} (5.3)
is generated. In order to hide the genuine set T , a chaff point set
C = {(C1, Q(C1)), (C2, Q(C2)), . . . , (Cm, Q(Cm))} (5.4)
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is created and mixed into the genuine set T . Note that any point (Ci, Q(Ci)) in C
should not lie on polynomial P , e.g., Q(Ci) 6= P (Ci) for any i ∈ [1,m]. A redundancy
set R is created based on Block to correct errors when unlocking the vault. Error
correction code, such as Reed-Solomon code is applied to encode the locking set Block
and generate the redundancy code set R. Finally, a fuzzy vault V = {T,R,C} is
locked and stored in a smartcard or server. Note that the created vault V is supposed
to reveal only very little information of either the private key or biometric signal,
therefore it can protect the privacy and security of both private key and biometric
information of user.
During the fuzzy lock unlocking, an unlocking set
Bunlock = {Bunlock 1, Bunlock 2, . . . , Bunlock n} (5.5)
is extracted from the authentication biometric signal. The Bunlock is corrected using
the redundancy code set R generated when locking the vault. If the authentication
biometric signal is similar enough to the enrolled one, the error correction code should
be able to correct all the error bits and recover the exactly same set as Block. It is
now very easy to separate the genuine set T and chaff point set C from the vault V .
After is successfully recovered from V , the polynomial P is derived using Lagrange
interpolation. Suppose T = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), , (xn, yn)} is obtained from the error
correction, for instance, RS decoding, P (x) is interpolated as follows:
P (x) =
f(x)
(x− x1)f ′(x1)y1 +
f(x)
(x− x2)f ′(x2)y2 + . . .+
f(x)
(x− xn)f ′(xn)yn, (5.6)
where
f(x) = (x− x1)(x− x2) . . . (x− xn), (5.7)
and f
′
(x) is the derivative of f(x). Finally the private key K is recovered by concate-
nating the coefficient of P (x). Obviously, fuzzy vault can be used to protect a private
key for encryption usage. In the other hand, the match of the derived key with the
stored key indicates the match of biometric signal, therefore fuzzy vault can also be
used as a template secured biometric authentication scheme.
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However, the above scheme has some limitations if directly applied to biometric
system. First of all, the scheme is not cancelable or revocable, e.g., if the biometric
template is stolen, there is no easy way to revoke the obsolete vault and reissue a
new one like password. That will lead to severe consequence in real-life applications.
Second, the application of error correction requires the whole encoding and decoding
process implementing in Galois Field (GF). It is very challenging to transform the
biometric template into a stable binary template with low bit error rate. Moreover,
the more variation between the enrolled template and the authenticate template,
the more bits is needed for the error correction redundancy code, which makes the
encoding and decoding process very time-consuming. The proposed design in this
chapter will mainly address the above two concerns.
5.2.2 Proposed Fuzzy Vault Design for Non-Cooperative Iris Recognition
The proposed fuzzy vault design in this thesis makes use of the stableness of the
large scale feature points detected among irises from the same class in Chapter 3. The
positions of the matched feature point pairs are used as the genuine set T mentioned
in Chapter 5.2.1. The descriptor of the corresponding feature point is compared to
the enrolled template to determine whether it is an enrolled point. No error correction
code is needed for this scheme. There is also no need to store the private key in the
server. Instead, the private key is held by user himself/herself as a smartcard or
token, which eliminates the danger of being hacked in the server. The flowchart of
the proposed design is shown in Figure 5.4. We will discuss the vault locking and
vault unlocking process separately next.
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Locking the vault
During the vault locking process (Figure 5.4a), several iris images from each sub-
ject are selected as the enrollment/training images. Feature points are located and
described using the method introduced in Chapter 3. The more stable large scale
points are picked out as the candidate locking set. In this design, only feature points
with scale 3 or higher are selected. The corresponding 10× 72 feature map and local
descriptor are generated.
To make the locking set cancelable, a user specified external randomness (a unique
user key or token) is added to the scheme. A 128-bit private key is used to re-arrange
the feature map. Each sub-regions of the original 10× 72 feature map is re-mapped
to a new position on the 256× 256 transformed feature map (Figure 5.5).
To realize the transform, the unique 128-bit private key is input into a pseudo-
random number generator as a random seed. The results of the pseudo-random
number generator are applied to a transformation process that re-maps each of the
sub-regions from the original mapping arrangement into the newly transformed map-
ping. The transformation process re-maps the arrangement of the sub-regions, while
leaving the contents of the local descriptor in each sub-region unchanged from the
original mapping. A one way hash encryption function or DES-based method can be
used to map the input seed into 720 128-bit strings using the ANSI X9.17 pseudo-
random number generator algorithm [93]. The 720 bit string sequence constitutes a
unique random permutation applied to the original feature map. The pseudo-random
number generator will produce the same numeric sequence when used with the same
seed during a future transformation process. This allows for subsequently generated
iris mappings to undergo the same transformation, producing a consistently trans-
formed mapping arrangement for matching. if the attacker gets the original template
arrangement, the system can regenerate a new pin. The corresponding templates in
the enrollment database should be deleted and the user should be re-enrolled in the
database to achieve cancelability.
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To lock the vault, the 128-bit private key is divided into 8 16-bit binary strings
and each string is a coefficient of the 8-degree polynomial P . The coordinates of
each feature point on the transformed feature map are used as the input of the
polynomial. The x, y coordinates (0-255) of each feature point is converted into an 8-
bit binary code and the two binary code are concatenated as x | y. The concatenated
coordinates are evaluated by the polynomial P . The genuine set T is created as T =
{(B1, P (B1)), (B2, P (B2)), , Bn, P (Bn)} where Bi = xi | yi, | stands for concatenation
and n is the number of enrolled feature points.
To hide the genuine set, a set of chaff points C is added to the genuine set T
and the number of chaff points is from 1 to 64816 (65536 - 720), depending on the
required security strength (Figure 5.5). A fake descriptor for each chaff point is
randomly generated and stored along with the true descriptor as D. The fuzzy vault
V = {T,C,M,D} is finally locked, where T is the genuine set, C is the chaff point set,
M is the 256× 256 transformed feature map and D is the corresponding descriptor.
Unlocking the vault
During the vault unlocking (Figure 5.4b), each user presents both his/her iris
pattern and a unique private key to the system. The same feature points detection and
description process is applied to each authenticate iris. The large scale feature points
are located and a corresponding feature map and a descriptor set. The generated
feature map is remapped to a 256× 256 feature map by the unique private key using
the same algorithm as the vault locking. The transformed feature map is compared
with the enrolled feature map M in the vault to find the all the overlapping feature
points. Only those overlapping pairs with close descriptors are considered to be a valid
hit. The similarity of two feature points is determined by the Euclidean distance of
their related descriptors. The x, y coordinates of the hit points are concatenated and
the genuine set T of the vault is recognized. Lagrange interpolation in Chapter 5.2.1
is applied to the genuine set T to recover the polynomial P and the locked private
key is derived. The match of the derived private key with the user key indicates a
successful authentication.
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Fig. 5.5.: User specified transformation.
During the authentication, there could be four scenarios:
• The same user with the correct private key : The access is valid if there are
enough hit points to unlock the vault.
• The same user with incorrect private key : The access should be denied since
the wrong key will lead to a wrong transformation. The derived key will not be
able to match with the user key due to the lack of hit points.
• Different users with correct private key : The access should be denied since the
small similarity between the two irises will lead to a completely wrong unlocking
set, which derives a mismatched key.
• Different users with incorrect key : The access should be denied because neither
the iris pattern nor the user specified transformation is matched therefore the
probability of the match of the derived key from a completely wrong unlocking
and the incorrect user key is negligible.
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5.3 Experimental Results
5.3.1 Experimental Results for Key Incorporation Cancelable Scheme
For experiment 1, we use the 1527 left eyes of ICE Database, which provides
1165101 comparisons. In order to show the performance of our method in general
situations, we randomly assign a unique key to each user and apply random transfor-
mations to the biometrics templates every time and we do this 10 times, which means
we revoke the old key and re-issue a new key 10 times. We first apply the traditional
method without key information incorporated to the 10 transformed datasets, The 10
ROC curves using traditional Gabor Descriptor are shown in Figure 5.6a, the results
using key information incorporated cancelable approach are shown in Figure 5.6b.
The EERs comparisons of the 10 random experiments are listed in Figure 5.6c, we
can see that the recognition accuracy has been dramatically improved.
Table 5.1 compares using 2-D Gabor wavelet matching, 1-D Log-Gabor match-
ing, our Gabor Descriptor and the proposed cancelable method results on annular
iris images of the ICE database. To be comparable, all the methods use the same
segmentation method and frontal-look images. It is shown that our original Gabor
Descriptor method can achieve accuracy close to the traditional 2-D Gabor wavelet
method and 1-D Log-Gabor method. Our proposed cancelable method can effec-
tively reduce the FAR to achieve 0.001 EER. Moreover, our methods can work well
in non-cooperative situations (off-angle eyes). Most of the eyes from different classes
are directly rejected during the stored ring number checking process; therefore high
accuracy is reasonable.
We also compare the proposed key incorporated cancelable iris recognition method
with the matching results from top iris recognition companies/groups who partici-
pated in ICE in 2005 [66]. (Table 5.2) Our key incorporated cancelable method can
achieve better results than the best team, at the same time achieving cancelability.
63
For experiment 2, IUPUI database is used to measure the performance of the
key incorporation cancelable scheme for non-cooperative situation. We used the ICE
2005 matching protocol in this experiment: each image is matched against all other
images in the database. Therefore, all 3690 images were used in our experiment,
comprising 6.8 million comparisons in the matching stage. Our own non-cooperative
segmentation algorithm was used to automatically obtain the iris region. Similar to
experiments on ICE database, we randomly assign a unique key to each user and
apply random transformations controlled by the user key to the iris templates of
each user. The 10 times results of our traditional method without key information
incorporated are shown in Figure 5.7a. We then use the proposed cancelable approach
to test the 10 trials; the results are shown in Figure 5.7b, where we can see that our
result is very steady and promising. Figure 5.7c shows the 10 EERs (Equal Error
Rates) comparison: Our Gabor Descriptor result for IUPUI database is 5.24% while
the average EER of our 10 times experiment using proposed method is 0.3965%.This
shows that the proposed method does not change the genuine matching results, but
greatly increases the matching distance of imposters.
Table 5.3 compares the results of using the two traditional cooperative iris recogni-
tion algorithms, 2-D Gabor wavelet matching [29] and 1-D Log-Gabor matching [41],
with our Gabor Descriptor [58] and the proposed cancelable method on the centered
eyes from our IUPUI remote database. The proposed method result is the average
result of 10 times experiments. To make the comparison result reasonable, we only
use the 610 frontal-look images (cooperative situation) and use the same segmenta-
tion outputs. Our Gabor Descriptor method results are comparable to the results
achieved using traditional matching algorithms and our proposed cancelable method
can effectively reduce FAR, which improves the accuracy.
All the above experiments using the key incorporation cancelable method achieve
very promising results, which is reasonable because we pre-assigned totally random
keys to different users. The key variation will result in totally different transfor-
mations which will be detected by our matching algorithm with ring information
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examination. Therefore, nearly all the false acceptance cases are excluded because
they cannot pass the ring number check mechanism. One thing to point out here is,
our scheme is not a direct and simple combination of key check and iris comparisons,
but incorporates the key information into the biometric templates. We do not di-
rectly compare the user key but extract the key information from the iris templates
and quickly exclude imposters. The extracted key information reveals just a small
part of information of both transformation key and original biometric template, which
makes it impossible for attackers to recover the true information. In such a way, we
can better protect the user key and achieve high accuracy, as well as reducing the
matching time.
From our experimental results, we can see that our method effectively obtains
cancelability while reducing the FAR greatly and thus improving the recognition ac-
curacy. Most of the false acceptances are rejected due to our transformation checking
mechanism by comparing the stored ring number before matching. The unique can-
celable transformation actually provides more information for identity verification.
Moreover, the non-invertible transformation is carried out on descriptor templates
without changing or ruining the original feature information. Thus, the added trans-
formation greatly increases the recognition accuracy.
5.3.2 Experimental Results for Key-binding Cancelable Scheme
For the key-binding cancelable scheme, left eyes of ICE 2005 database is used to
measure the proposed fuzzy vault design in Chapter 5.2.2. There are 119 subjects
altogether and the first iris image of each subject is encoded to form the vault. A
unique 128 bit private key is assigned to each subject to conduct the cancelable
transformation and is used to create the vault locking polynomial as well.
To measure the False Rejection Rate (FRR), all other irises from the each sub-
ject are through the same feature detection and extraction process. The remapped
template is generated and compare with the one locked in the vault. The genuine
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set is determined by checking the distance between the overlapping feature points
from the vault. Lagrange interpolation is applied to the derived genuine set and to
reconstruct the polynomial whose coefficients are concatenated as the 128 private key.
The matching of the derived private key with the assigned key indicates a genuine
acceptance. For different polynomial degrees, the Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR)
is shown in Figure 5.8. For all the 16180 intra-class matching, we achieve a 95.94%
GAR at degree 4, which means a 4.06% FRR. As the polynomial degree goes up, more
hit points are needed to unlock the vault therefore the increase of FRR is reasonable.
However, even for degree 8, we still achieve an 89% GAR. The results are promising
compared to other fuzzy vault implementations [78,97–99].
To measure the corresponding False Acceptance Rate (FAR), we try to unlock the
vault using the irises which are not the same class as the enrolled one, which consists
1150448 inter-class matches. Theoretically, with the increase of polynomial degree,
the FAR should be reduced since the possibility that an inter-class pair of iris contains
enough hit points to unlock the vault at high polynomial degree is negligible. For all
polynomial degrees from 4 to 8, none of these inter-class tests can unlock the vault.
Hence the FAR of the proposed scheme is 0, which is very promising.
We can also measure the security of our fuzzy vault system quantitatively. Assume
that an attacker tries to unlock the vault by separating the genuine set from the chaff
points set using brutal force attack. To unlock a vault of polynomial degree 8, at least
8 genuine points needs to be correctly located. The vault has altogether 65536 points
and we suppose each iris has 20 feature points at high scale which is the average
case, therefore the possibility of a successful brutal attack is C(20, 8)/C(65536, 8) ≈
1.5×10−29. In another word, it will take an average of 6.7×1028 trials for an attacker
to crack the vault, which corresponds to a computational time of more than 7× 1011
years for a 3.0 GHz computer if we assume each trial takes even only one evaluation.
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Table 5.1: Comparison of different matching algorithms for ICE 2005 left eyes
Algorithm Images # EER
GAR at
FAR = 0.1%
GAR at
FAR = 0.01%
2-D Gabor 1527 1.26% 97.50% 96.29%
1-D Log-Gabor 1527 1.06% 97.39% 95.33%
Gabor Descriptor 1527 2.57% 93.16% 89.16%
The proposed cancelable
approach(average result
from 10 trials)
1527 0.10% 99.85% 99.62%
Table 5.2: Comparison of our method and others results
Group name Database used
GAR at
FAR = 0.1%
GAR at
FAR = 0.01%
SAGEM [13]
ICE database left eyes
(1527 images)
99.1% 98.9%
IritchD[13]
ICE database left eyes
(1527 images)
99.2% 98.6%
CMU[13]
ICE database left eyes
(1527 images)
99.1% 98.2%
CAM2(Daugman’s
method) [13]
ICE database left eyes
(1527 images)
98.9% 98.6%
Proposed cancelable
method
ICE database left eyes
(1527 images)
99.8% 99.6%
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(a) ROC Curves of 10 Trials using the Gabor Descriptor Method (ICE)
(b) ROC Curves of 10 Trials Using Proposed Method (ICE)
Fig. 5.6.: Result of experiments on ICE 2005 database (ICE database left eyes)
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(c) Comparison of EER
Fig. 5.6.: Continued
Table 5.3: Comparison of different matching algorithms for IUPUI Database
Algorithm Image # EER
GAR at
FAR = 0.1%
GAR at
FAR = 0.01%
2-D Gabor 610(frontal-look) 1.79% 92.57% 88.56%
1-D Log-Gabor 610(frontal-look) 2.95% 92.35% 89.80%
Gabor Descriptor 610(frontal-look) 2.73% 92.63% 87.61%
The proposed cancelable
approach(average result
from 10 trials)
610(frontal-look) 0.23% 99.77% 98.81%
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(a) ROC Curves of 10 Trials using Traditional Method (IUPUI)
(b) ROC Curves of 10 Trials using Proposed Method (IUPUI)
Fig. 5.7.: Result of experiment on entire IUPUI database
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(c) Comparison of EER
Fig. 5.7.: Continued
Fig. 5.8.: GAR at different polynomial degrees (FAR = 0)
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
There are mainly three contributions in this thesis: (1) a speed-up multi-stage
non-cooperative iris recognition approach is proposed, (2) a key-incorporation-based
non-cooperative iris recognition approach is proposed, and (3) a key-binding-based
iris authentication approach is proposed.
The proposed speed-up multi-stage non-cooperative iris recognition approach makes
use of the integral image and box filter to accelerate feature point detection similar to
SURF method. Gabor wavelet based multi-scale local descriptor is applied to describe
each detected feature point, which outperforms the other two popularly used local
descriptors (SURF and DAISY) proved by the experimental results. A multi-stage
matching algorithm is then applied to the generated multi-scale local descriptor. The
high repeatability of detected feature point at large scales can be used to quickly sep-
arate different iris classes while the Gabor wavelet based descriptor can further detect
details in iris texture pattern. The new designed multi-scale descriptor is shown to
achieve high recognition accuracy even with low resolution off-angle iris images.
Based on the previous non-cooperative iris recognition approach, two security
enhanced cancelable iris recognition are proposed to protect the iris template. The
proposed key incorporated cancelable method achieves cancelability by applying a
non-invertible transformation to the original sub-region based template. The user
key information is incorporated with the transformed template by recording radial
location of each feature point. The key-incorporated cancelable approach can achieve
cancelability and also improve recognition accuracy, which is demonstrated by the
experimental results on two databases (IUPUI and ICE).
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The proposed key-binding scheme solves several limitations of the traditional fuzzy
vault: the proposed method achieves cancelability by including a user specified ex-
ternal randomness to generate a cancelable template; the high stability of the large
scale point location from two irises from the same class is utilized as the mutual in-
formation required by fuzzy vault scheme therefore error-correction code is no longer
required to achieve stableness. The experimental results on ICE database shows that
the proposed key-bind scheme can achieve 0 FAR and a very low FRR, which is very
promising for high-security level applications using iris in the future.
There are some more work can be done in the future to improve the current ap-
proach. For the speed-up multi-stage non-cooperative iris recognition approach, a
proper approximation of the Gabor filter used in feature description using a set of
box filters can be applied to further increase the descriptor generation speed without
reducing the accuracy too much. More experiments can be done on other databases
to show the effectiveness of this approach. For the key-binding system, more mutual
information between two irises can be extracted to increase the degree of the polyno-
mial so that the scheme can provide more flexibility in more secure applications with
longer key.
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